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2 
Falling birth rates and world population decline: A 
quantitative discussion (1950-2040) 
 
1. Introduction 
Although demographics is a determining factor in explaining the long-term 
development of an economy -together with ‘the stock of human knowledge particularly 
as applied to the human command over nature; and the institutional framework that 
defines the deliberate incentive structure of a society’- (North, 2005, p. 1; see also 
Sachs, 2002), it is usually understated in economic growth theory. Population long-term 
dynamics is often described in a very simplified or mechanistic way: in fact, population 
dynamics tends to be represented by means of simple dynamic models. In this sense, it 
is quite usual to consider the evolution of population in economic models under a 
Malthusian growth dynamics assumption.
1
  
In this paper we present a quantitative discussion of world population prospects which 
questions Malthusian dynamics. Extrapolating UN data (available since 1950), it would 
be expected that world population stagnates because of the decline in birth rates 
presently observable both globally and by continents. According to the population 
database of the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
of the UN Secretariat,
2
 fertility rates are below replacement levels in all continents 
except Africa. Because of the momentum gained in previous decades, world population 
and continental population in Africa, the Americas (Northern America and Latin 
America), Asia and Europe are still increasing at a slow rate, but demographers see 
signs of decrease in world population somewhere around the middle of the 21
st
 Century 
(Chaunu, 1997; Eberstadt, 2001). 
 
                                                     
1
 In (endogenous) economic growth literature (see for example Acemoglu (2009)), economic growth 
models usually assume that labor (as an approximation for population) increases following the rule 
0
nt
tL L e , with 0 , 0L n  . This is a typical Malthusian (Malthus, 1985 [1798]) dynamics.  
2
 Data source: UN Population Division (http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm). For the years 
1920, 1930, 1940 and 1950 the source is UN (1959) Demographic Yearbook, New York, p. 127.  
3 
The implications of the expected evolution of population are far reaching from an 
economic point of view –and indeed from any point of view: social, political, geo-
strategic, environmental, etc. (Ulrich, 2000; Yea, 2004). And the reason is not only 
population stagnation but, to a great extent, the change in the age composition of human 
population. For the first time in history humanity as a whole confronts ageing as a 
global problem.  
In order to simulate population trends, we present in this paper a very simple 
mathematical model using a hyperbolic tangent solution fitting effectively any jump in 
population level. The Improved Rate Equation (IRE) solutions are used, as far as we 
know, for the very first time to model population dynamics and it is one of the main 
contributions of this article.
3
 The other main contribution consists of applying this (IRE) 
to the world as a whole. Previously, a rate equations approach has been recently 
proposed by the authors to describe steps up or down in population due to changes in 
birth rate (BR), death rate (DR) or both (see Gonzalo, Muñoz, & Santos, 2013). A step 
up in population between a given starting population level  RL nP  (replacement level) 
and a certain final population level  
1RL n
P

, -where P means ‘population’, RL 
‘replacement level’ and n and n + 1 refer, respectively, to the initial level and to the 
final level for which population dynamics evolves at a certain rate.
4
 In that previous 
model, population dynamics was determined by the (BR) extracted from the fertility rate 
(FR), and the (DR) extracted from the combination of the death rate (DR) and the 
growth rate (GR) (Ibid., pp. 194-195). Suppose that at a given replacement level RL, 
2.1FR  and BR DR . Since the UN data show that the overall (FR) (world and 
individual continents) has decreased consistently in the period 1950-2010, we assume 
that the long-term initial  
n
DR  -compensated for a    
n n
BR DR  - is higher than the 
final  
1n
DR

 -compensated for a    
1n n
BR BR

  in the long run. Under these 
assumptions, population dynamics would be essentially governed by an increase in life 
expectancy. However, increases in life expectancy cannot go on forever.  
 
                                                     
3
 An excellent survey on population dynamics is provided by Bacaër (2011). See also Miranda and Lima 
(2010; 2011). The (IRE) model (see Eq. 1 bellow) is a certain improvement over the simple rate equations 
solution given in (Gonzalo et al., 2013) 
4
 In other words, (RL) means that birth rates and death rates are equal at that instant of time.  
4 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to data analysis globally 
and by continents. Section 3 shows and compares the projections of world population of 
UN and those obtained with the IRE model. Section 4 discusses the main findings and 
implications of the model.  
 
2. Data analysis 
UN data (1950-2010) show a strong proportionality between the birth rate the birth rate 
(BR) and fertility rate (FR). Table 1 shows how consistent is the proportionality 
between (BR) and (FR) for the world and the various continents.
5
 
[Table 1] 
Table 2 gives the respective fertility rate (FR), growth rate (GR), birth rate (BR), death 
rate (DR) for Africa, Asia, Europe, Northern America, Latin America, Oceania and the 
World respectively. From these data it is possible to calculate the value of the variables
/x BR DR , y BR DR  , 
1
Ln
2
x  , 1 1 2 22 10y     and   (characteristic time) for 
the years 1950-55 to 2005-2010, adding the extrapolated UN data –using UN medium-
fertility variant hypothesis- for 2010-15.
6
 In all cases, the raw UN data are (FR), (BR), 
(DR) and (GR). Variables x, y,  , 1  , and   are calculated as defined above.  
[Table 2] 
Figure 1 is a representation of (BR) vs. (FR), for the Europe and Northern America (1a), 
Africa and Latin America (1b), and Asia and the World (1c). The patterns are very 
similar and a quick reduction of the relationship between (BR) and (FR) is observed in 
all continents. Figure 2a and 2b show the behavior of  x t  and  t  respectively.7 
Time evolution of  x t  and  t  by continents speak for themselves.  
[Figure 1] 
                                                     
5
 The proportionality factors for each continent have been determined by means of a representative 
sample of the most populous countries in each continent. 
6
 Along the paper we use usually UN projections under low-fertility variant because historically this 
variant has been more consistent with actual data as time went by. 
7
 For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we omit references to Oceania.  
5 
[Figure 2a] 
[Figure 2b] 
Table 3 gives the world population  UNP t  -UN data- for the period 1950-2040, along 
with the calculated population  calP t  using the (IRE) model, where: 
      inf*
1
tanh 1 tanh
2
cal RL m
t t
P t P P 

 
    
 
  (1) 
 
and mP  tanh , inft  and 
*  represent, respectively the jump amplitude -that depends 
on the values of (RL) n and (RL) n+1 (in this case 5.86 billions)-, the inflection point (at 
year 1985), and the characteristic time -that is somehow related to the average fertility 
age for women.  
[Table 3] 
In order to fit the function to current data and compute the associated projection, we use 
   91960 2.0 10RLP , inf 1985t  and  
* 32  years. Additionally, Eq. (1) makes use of 
the next approximation:  
         22 4 21 11 tanh 1 1 2 1
2 2
x xx x xx e e e e
            (2) 
where 
2 411
2
x xe e 
 
  
 
 for x in the interval 0 x  . This is equivalent to the 
previous (more abrupt) rate equation solution (Gonzalo et al., 2013) where 
inf
1965t  
(instead of 
inf
1985t  ) and * 27.2   years (instead of  * 32  years).  
Figure 3 shows the good fit obtained for the time span 1950-2040.  
[Figure 3] 
Table 4 gives in parallel columns the death rates (DR) and the estimated inverse female 
life expectancy of females  
1
fLE

 for Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the 
World (1950-2010) -extrapolated from actual data. There seems to be a minimum 
6 
inverse life expectancy around  
1
21.2 10fLE
    which corresponds to a maximum 
  83.3fLE   years. The world data follow a straight line going through the origin. In 
fact, a zero death rate (DR) should correspond to an ‘infinite life expectancy’. The data 
for Europe seem to undergo a time reversal at about  
1
21.20 10fLE
   .8 Data in Table 
4, corresponding to 1950-2010, are depicted in Figure 4.
9
  
[Table 4] 
[Figure 4] 
A comparison between the time evolution of (BR) and (DR) for Europe and the World is 
given in Table 5 from 1950 to 2040.
10
 The behavior of (BR) (related to the fertility rate) 
determine the trend of the population evolution in both cases. The momentum in net 
growth rate (GR) due to normal fertility in previous generations does not show yet an 
actual decrease with time in the resulting net population for the world (WBR is still 
larger than WDR), but for Europe, after a long period of increasing ‘life expectation’, 
the death rate is already going up, and since about 2000, it has surpassed the declining 
birth rate (EDR > EBR). Sometime around the middle of this century the same thing is 
likely to happen for the world as a whole. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
[Table 5] 
[Figure 5] 
 
3. Trends and projections 
Since the early sixties of last century an exponential growth of world population was 
assumed in many influential circles including the UN and most Western governmental 
circles.
11
 Even most recently, after signs to the contrary are increasingly evident, 
                                                     
8
 According to UN data (1990-2010), Japan (a large rich and ageing country) shows a similar time 
reversal.  
9
 More direct data for death rate and life expectancy might show perhaps a little less statistical scatter; 
however the general trend is clear.  
10
 From 2010-2040 we represent UN projections for low-fertility variant. 
11
 The Club of Rome was the most famous and perhaps most influential one. See also the interest of 
Science on this topic: (Aldrich, 1968; Caldwell, 2008; Dorn, 1962; Holden, 1974, 1984; Horiuchi, 1992; 
Mead, 1974; Sachs, 2002; Sax, 1969).  
7 
respected media personalities -like Stephen Hawking- insist on the spectre of 
exponential growth. It is straightforward to construct a Malthusian projection for 1985-
2040 using 1.85GR  that corresponds to the increase of world population between 
1985-1990 by means of 
       
5
1
1Malthus n n nP t P t GR     (3) 
 
For 2010, the Malthusian projection gives a world population of  97.60 10  -instead of 
the actual population of  96.90 10 - and would continue growing exponentially.
12
 
Table 6 gives the numerical data for these projections. Figure 6 depicts these results for 
the period 1950-2010 (actual data) together with those of the Malthusian projection, the 
(IRE) projection and UN projection (low fertility variant, the more realistic) for (2010-
2040).
13
 
[Figure 6] 
 
 
4. Discussion  
The sustained reproductive capability of the human race is clearly much larger than that 
of other higher animals on Earth’s surface. Today, homo sapiens number about 97 10  
individuals scattered all over the planet while only about 43 10  individuals of the 
species orangutan, gorilla and chimpanzee populate some parts of Asia and Africa, after 
fifteen, ten and five million years, respectively, of their appearance on Earth. Our planet 
has considerable potential reserves of food, water and energy to house a human 
population estimated as some twenty or thirty times larger than the present one. 
Nevertheless, these potential reserves are finite. 
The main findings of our approach point out to the following: 
                                                     
12
 Assuming a growth rate of 0.0185 and departing from actual population in 1985.  
13
 It would be very interesting to analyze whether with pre-1965 pre-chemical contraceptives, pre-
legalized abortion, and modest ‘spontaneous’ decrease in fertility rates, world population would have 
leveled out at mid-21st Century. However, this exercise is out of the scope of this paper.  
8 
1. A continuous exponential world population growth is totally unrealistic. Rather, steps 
up (alternated with relatively stable periods or step down) should be expected. Usually, 
an increase in life expectancy (LE) is followed by a gradual decrease in fertility rate 
(FR). However, certain drastic policies promoting contraception and abortion (as is the 
case of China) may result in unwanted population trends with deleterious human, social 
and economic consequences.
14
  
2. It is interesting to note that the local population density in various countries with 
annual per capita income in the range 15,000 to 45,000 USD is between five times and 
fifteen times higher than the present average world population.
15
  
3. Taking into account that: (a) the replacement level fertility rate is about 2.1FR   
child per woman; (b) the birth rate is of the order of  0.75BR FR ; (c) the life 
expectancy at fertility age (about 18 years),     18fa bLE LE , and for cases like 
Europe and Japan, for which population has leveled out already (and is even decreasing) 
as shown above,      / 0.833)bLE DR , population replacement level  BR DR  is 
attained when 
   2 20.75 2.1 10 1.57 10BR DR            (4) 
corresponding to  
        18 / 0.833 70.8bLE DR  years    (5)  
An increase in women’s life expectancy beyond 70.8 years is unlikely to result in an 
increase of birth rate. 
4. Finally, graphs of population data of steps up in population for all continents could be 
fitted by means of our (IRE) (Eq. 1) for Africa, Europe, Asia, Northern America and 
Latin America. To this end, first the inflection point (corresponding to the maximum 
                                                     
14
 An example of this concern is a recent report urging a change in China’s one child policy. See The 
Guardian, 31
st
 October 2012, ‘China think-tank urges end of one-child policy. Foundation close to central 
leadership urges end to birth limits policy across China by 2015, with experts saying reform is 
‘inevitable’.’ The cited think-tank is China Development Research Foundation 
(http://www.cdrf.org.cn/en/). 
15
 For instance: in UK, 5 time larger; in the Netherlands, 8 times; in Puerto Rico, 9 times; in South Korea, 
10 times; in Taiwan, 13 times. Not counting exceptional cases like Hong Kong (with 6.4 million 
inhabitants), 126 times and Singapore (with 7.0 million inhabitants) which has 139 times the world 
average. 
9 
slope) for the step up in population should be estimated. This would allow us to get 
inft , 
 infP t , RLP , and 
*
mP  for each continent. Then 
*  is determined by means of  
  
 * 1
*
2
/ tanh
RL
m
P t P
t
P
 
  
   
 
    (6) 
Where the data for t  is well known, in principle, for all continents while data for 
t  is not for Africa, Europe, Asia, Northern America, Latin America and Oceania. If 
data for t  and t  were available it is possible to calculate an average 
   * * *
1
2
t t        . If not, it is still possible to use  
* * t   .  
 
Finally, in this paper we have focused in the role of inertia for the demographic 
evolution. An investigation of world population trends and their implications from other 
perspectives deserves special attention. 
 
 
TABLES 
Table 1: The relationship between birth rates and fertility rates by continents. 
Africa BR = 0.7114 FR 
Europe  BR = 0.7502 FR 
Asia BR = 0.7267 FR 
Northern America BR = 0.7205 FR 
Latin America BR = 0.7334 FR 
Oceania BR = 0.7216 FR 
World BR = 0.7394 FR 
 
Table 2: Regional and World population data: 1950-2015.*  
Table 2a: Africa 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 1     
1950-55 6.60 2.114 4.7735 2.71 2.26 12.94 0.41 0.07 13.90 
1955-60 6.66 2.305 4.7656 3.21 1.48 15.30 0.20 0.08 12.78 
1960-65 6.71 2.439 4.7361 3.26 1.45 15.44 0.19 0.08 12.72 
10 
1965-70 6.68 2.560 4.6578 3.14 1.48 14.63 0.20 0.08 13.07 
1970-75 6.67 2.651 4.6123 2.88 1.60 13.28 0.24 0.07 13.72 
1975-80 6.57 2.772 4.5478 2.57 1.77 11.69 0.29 0.07 14.63 
1980-85 6.39 2.797 4.4328 2.39 1.85 10.59 0.31 0.07 15.36 
1985-90 6.07 2.692 4.2527 2.18 1.95 9.27 0.33 0.06 16.42 
1990-95 5.62 2.529 4.0209 1.81 2.22 7.28 0.40 0.05 18.53 
1995-2000 5.23 2.357 3.837 1.91 2.01 7.33 0.35 0.05 18.47 
2000-05 4.94 2.326 3.7133 1.76 2.11 6.54 0.37 0.05 19.56 
2005-10 4.64 2.301 3.5587 1.15 3.09 4.09 0.56 0.04 24.72 
2010-15 4.37 2.274 3.4039 1.37 2.48 4.66 0.46 0.04 23.15 
 
Table 2b: Asia 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 
1     
1950-55 5.82 1.978 4.18 2.57 1.63 10.74 0.24 0.07 15.25 
1955-60 5.58 1.947 3.92 2.35 1.67 9.22 0.26 0.06 16.46 
1960-65 5.59 1.988 3.85 2.12 1.82 8.16 0.30 0.06 17.50 
1965-70 5.61 2.478 3.81 1.95 1.96 7.44 0.34 0.05 18.34 
1970-75 5.00 2.282 3.46 1.64 2.11 5.67 0.37 0.05 21.00 
1975-80 4.05 1.946 2.96 1.33 2.23 3.94 0.40 0.04 25.19 
1980-85 3.69 1.944 2.88 0.96 3.00 2.76 0.55 0.03 30.08 
1985-90 3.44 1.918 2.80 0.76 3.69 2.13 0.65 0.03 34.26 
1990-95 2.97 1.626 2.48 0.69 3.60 1.71 0.64 0.03 38.22 
1995-2000 2.65 1.384 2.20 0.68 3.25 1.50 0.59 0.02 40.88 
2000-05 2.41 1.180 1.98 0.69 2.85 1.37 0.52 0.02 42.70 
2005-10 2.28 1.082 1.86 0.68 2.72 1.27 0.50 0.02 44.35 
2010-15 2.18 0.990 1.75 0.70 2.51 1.22 0.46 0.02 45.29 
 
Table 2c: Europe 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 
1     
1950-55 2.65 0.996 2.144 1.07 2.00 2.30 0.35 0.03 32.96 
1955-60 2.64 0.971 2.072 1.07 1.93 2.22 0.33 0.03 33.53 
1960-65 2.56 0.961 1.908 1.04 1.83 1.99 0.30 0.03 35.48 
1965-70 2.35 0.691 1.672 1.15 1.45 1.92 0.19 0.03 36.06 
1970-75 2.17 0.608 1.559 1.08 1.44 1.68 0.18 0.03 38.54 
1975-80 1.98 0.489 1.476 1.03 1.43 1.52 0.18 0.02 40.56 
1980-85 1.89 0.398 1.434 1.06 1.35 1.52 0.15 0.02 40.56 
1985-90 1.82 0.384 1.370 0.97 1.41 1.33 0.17 0.02 43.37 
1990-95 1.57 0.191 1.151 1.07 1.08 1.23 0.04 0.02 45.16 
1995-2000 1.42 -0.018 1.024 1.08 0.95 1.11 -0.03 0.02 47.55 
2000-05 1.43 0.109 1.015 1.14 0.89 1.16 -0.06 0.02 46.48 
2005-10 1.53 0.203 1.076 1.18 0.91 1.27 -0.05 0.02 44.38 
2010-15 1.59 0.105 1.084 1.24 0.87 1.34 -0.07 0.02 43.13 
 
Table 2d: Northern America 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 
1     
1950-55 3.33 1.713 2.46 1.13 2.17 2.78 0.39 0.03 30.01 
11 
1955-60 3.64 1.776 2.46 1.32 1.86 3.24 0.31 0.04 27.77 
1960-65 3.36 1.408 2.20 1.13 1.95 2.49 0.33 0.03 31.69 
1965-70 2.55 1.071 1.77 1.01 1.76 1.79 0.28 0.03 37.35 
1970-75 2.05 0.936 1.57 1.14 1.38 1.79 0.16 0.03 37.36 
1975-80 1.80 0.974 1.51 0.47 3.21 0.71 0.58 0.02 59.41 
1980-85 1.79 0.969 1.54 0.47 3.28 0.73 0.59 0.02 58.70 
1985-90 1.87 1.028 1.55 0.53 2.93 0.82 0.54 0.02 55.14 
1990-95 1.96 1.012 1.51 0.86 1.76 1.30 0.28 0.02 43.85 
1995-2000 1.93 1.152 1.39 0.85 1.64 1.18 0.25 0.02 46.00 
2000-05 1.99 0.993 1.37 0.88 1.56 1.21 0.22 0.02 45.46 
2005-10 2.03 0.908 1.37 0.84 1.63 1.15 0.24 0.02 46.61 
2010-15 2.04 0.858 1.35 0.82 1.64 1.11 0.25 0.02 47.56 
 
Table 2e: Latin America 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 
1     
1950-55 5.86 2.715 4.27 2.38 1.79 10.15 0.29 0.06 15.69 
1955-60 5.92 2.758 4.19 2.38 1.76 9.97 0.28 0.06 15.83 
1960-65 5.96 2.759 4.11 2.36 1.74 9.69 0.28 0.06 16.06 
1965-70 5.53 2.510 3.78 2.17 1.74 8.22 0.28 0.06 17.44 
1970-75 5.02 2.411 3.51 1.85 1.90 6.49 0.32 0.05 19.62 
1975-80 4.47 2.293 3.30 1.51 2.19 4.98 0.39 0.04 22.41 
1980-85 3.93 2.098 3.07 1.23 2.50 3.78 0.46 0.04 25.73 
1985-90 3.42 1.924 2.79 1.00 2.80 2.78 0.51 0.03 29.99 
1990-95 3.02 1.713 2.53 0.85 2.97 2.16 0.54 0.03 34.04 
1995-2000 2.73 1.546 2.32 0.76 3.03 1.77 0.55 0.03 37.58 
2000-05 2.53 1.321 2.14 0.73 2.94 1.56 0.54 0.02 40.04 
2005-10 2.30 1.153 1.93 0.72 2.69 1.38 0.49 0.02 42.49 
2010-15 2.17 1.068 1.78 0.75 2.39 1.33 0.44 0.02 43.40 
 
Table 2f: Oceania 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 
1     
1950-55 3.81 2.222 2.75 2.38 1.15 6.54 0.07 0.05 19.56 
1955-60 4.02 2.150 2.72 2.38 1.14 6.47 0.07 0.05 19.65 
1960-65 4.00 2.063 2.65 2.36 1.12 6.24 0.06 0.05 20.02 
1965-70 3.57 2.186 2.44 2.17 1.13 5.31 0.06 0.05 21.69 
1970-75 3.30 1.936 2.44 1.85 1.32 4.51 0.14 0.04 23.55 
1975-80 2.74 1.334 2.11 1.51 1.40 3.18 0.17 0.04 28.02 
1980-85 2.58 1.606 2.04 1.23 1.66 2.50 0.25 0.03 31.59 
1985-90 2.49 1.602 1.98 1.00 1.98 1.97 0.34 0.03 35.62 
1990-95 2.49 1.484 1.95 0.85 2.29 1.66 0.41 0.03 38.76 
1995-2000 2.45 1.387 1.87 0.76 2.44 1.43 0.45 0.02 41.89 
2000-05 2.41 1.487 1.78 0.73 2.44 1.29 0.45 0.02 43.95 
2005-10 2.49 1.747 1.80 0.72 2.50 1.29 0.46 0.02 44.00 
2010-15 2.45 1.455 1.73 0.75 2.33 1.29 0.42 0.02 43.99 
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Table 2g: World 
Years FR GR BR DR x y α 
1     
1950-55 4.95 1.816 3.686 1.871 1.97 6.90 0.07 0.05 19.04 
1955-60 4.89 1.829 3.541 1.714 2.07 6.07 0.07 0.05 20.30 
1960-65 4.91 1.851 3.462 1.612 2.15 5.58 0.06 0.05 21.16 
1965-70 4.85 2.069 3.363 1.296 2.59 4.36 0.06 0.04 23.95 
1970-75 4.45 1.958 3.132 1.175 2.67 3.68 0.14 0.04 26.06 
1975-80 3.84 1.767 2.830 1.064 2.66 3.01 0.17 0.03 28.82 
1980-85 3.59 1.763 2.771 1.010 2.74 2.80 0.25 0.03 29.89 
1985-90 3.39 1.744 2.698 0.955 2.82 2.58 0.34 0.03 31.14 
1990-95 3.04 1.523 2.447 0.925 2.65 2.26 0.41 0.03 33.25 
1995-2000 2.79 1.339 2.236 0.897 2.49 2.01 0.45 0.03 35.30 
2000-05 2.62 1.216 2.085 0.869 2.40 1.81 0.45 0.03 37.15 
2005-10 2.52 1.162 2.001 0.839 2.38 1.68 0.46 0.03 38.59 
2010-15 2.45 1.096 1.915 0.819 2.34 1.57 0.42 0.03 39.92 
(*) Source UN World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (updated April 2011). For 2015 we use the Medium-
fertility variant 2010-2100. 
 
Table 3: Together with Table 6. 
 
Table 4: (DR) vs.  
1
fLE

 
 
World Africa Europe Asia N. Amer. L. Amer. 
Year  DR Lf-1 DR Lf-1 DR Lf-1 DR Lf-1 DR Lf-1 DR Lf-1 
1950-55 1.871 0.021 2.710 0.025 1.073 0.015 2.570 0.023 1.130 0.014 2.380 0.019 
1955-60 1.714 0.020 3.210 0.024 1.073 0.014 2.350 0.022 1.320 0.014 2.378 0.018 
1960-65 1.612 0.019 3.260 0.023 1.041 0.014 2.120 0.021 1.130 0.014 2.357 0.017 
1965-70 1.296 0.017 3.140 0.022 1.150 0.014 1.950 0.018 1.010 0.013 2.173 0.016 
1970-75 1.175 0.017 2.880 0.021 1.080 0.013 1.640 0.017 1.140 0.013 1.849 0.016 
1975-80 1.064 0.016 2.570 0.020 1.030 0.013 1.330 0.016 0.470 0.013 1.509 0.015 
1980-85 1.010 0.016 2.390 0.019 1.060 0.013 0.960 0.016 0.470 0.013 1.230 0.015 
1985-90 0.955 0.015 2.180 0.019 0.970 0.013 0.760 0.015 0.530 0.013 0.997 0.014 
1990-95 0.925 0.015 1.810 0.019 1.065 0.013 0.690 0.015 0.860 0.013 0.852 0.014 
1995-00 0.897 0.015 1.910 0.019 1.080 0.013 0.679 0.015 0.850 0.013 0.764 0.014 
2000-05 0.869 0.015 1.760 0.018 1.140 0.013 0.694 0.014 0.880 0.013 0.728 0.013 
2005-10 0.839 0.014 1.150 0.018 1.180 0.013 0.683 0.014 0.840 0.012 0.718 0.013 
 
Table 5:  
 
World 
 
Europe 
 
Years (BR) (DR) (BR) (DR) 
1950-55 3.69 1.87 2.14 1.07 
1955-60 3.54 1.71 2.07 1.07 
1960-65 3.46 1.61 1.91 1.04 
1965-70 3.36 1.30 1.67 1.15 
1970-75 3.13 1.18 1.56 1.08 
13 
1975-80 2.83 1.06 1.48 1.03 
1980-85 2.77 1.01 1.43 1.06 
1985-90 2.70 0.96 1.37 0.97 
1990-95 2.45 0.92 1.15 1.07 
1995-00 2.24 0.90 1.02 1.08 
2000-05 2.08 0.87 1.02 1.14 
2005-10 2.00 0.84 1.08 1.18 
2010-15 1.73  0.82  0.92  1.13  
2015-20 1.53  0.82  0.81  1.14  
2020-25 1.39  0.82  0.74  1.16  
2025-30 1.33  0.84  0.74  1.18  
2030-35 1.27  0.87  0.75  1.22  
2035-40 1.19  0.91  0.76  1.27  
2040-45 1.12  0.95  0.745  1.31  
Source: UN.  
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Table 3: World population 1950-2050.  
Year 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 
 
cal
P t  2.59 2.78 2.35 2.60 3.29 3.73 4.23 4.83 5.27 5.72 6.20 6.58 6.80 7.08 7.27 7.42 7.53 7.61 7.68 
 
UN
P t
 
2.53 2.77 3.02 3.33 3.69 4.06 4.34 4.83 5.26 5.67 6.07 6.40 6.69 7.22  7.48  7.69  7.87  8.01  8.10  
 
Calculated population (Pcal  using Eq. (1)) and UN data (PUN). Fitting parameters   1985t :   
9
1960 2.0 10
RL
P ; 
inf 1985t  ; 
* / cosh 30 years    ; 
9
m
1
tanh 2.93 10
2
P    .  
 
Table 6: A comparison of Malthusian, (IRE) and UN projections 1950-2040.  
Year 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 
 
UN
P t  
2.53  2.77  3.04  3.33  3.70  4.08  4.45  4.86  5.31  5.73  6.12  6.51  6.90  7.22  7.48  7.69  7.87  8.01  8.10  
 
cal
P t l 2.59 2.78 3.02 3.31 3.65 4.04 4.48 4.93 5.38 5.82 6.21 6.55 6.84 7.08 7.27 7.42 7.53 7.61 7.68 
 
Malthusian
P t  
2.53  2.77  3.04  3.33  3.70  4.08  4.45  4.86  5.32 5.81 6.36 6.95 7.60 8.30 9.08 9.93 10.85 11.87 12.97 
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Figures 
Figure 1: (BR) vs. (FR) by continents and the world. 
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Figure 2a: x(t) 
 
Figure 2b: τ(t) 
 
 
Figure 3: World actual (UN data) and (IRE) population fit for the period 1960-2010.  
 
Source: UN data and (IRE) model projection -Eq(1).  
1
tanh 2.93
2
m
P   , τ = 32, tinf = 1985, 
PRL = 2.0. Note: The shadow area corresponds to projections.  
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Figure 4: (DR) vs.  
1
fLE

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: (BR) & (DR) for the World and Europe 1950-2045.  
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Figure 6: Population projections 1950-2040.  
 
Source: UN data and (IRE) model projection –Eq. (1).  
1
tanh 2.93
2
m
P   , τ = 32, tinf = 1985, 
PRL = 2.0. Note: The shadow area corresponds to projections.  
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